Selective Bitplane Encryption for Secure Transmission of Image Data in Mobile Environments by Martina Podesser et al.
SELECTIVE BITPLANE ENCRYPTION FOR
SECURE TRANSMISSION OF IMAGE DATA IN MOBILE ENVIRONMENTS
Martina Podesser, Hans-Peter Schmidt, and Andreas Uhl
School of Telematics & Network Engineering
Carinthia Tech Institute, Klagenfurt, AUSTRIA
ABSTRACT
Weproposeselectivebitplaneencryptiontoprovidesecure
image transmission in low power mobile environments.
Two types of ciphertext only attacks against this scheme
are discussed and we use the corresponding results to de-
rive conditions for a secure use of this technique.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the area of multimedia security, the terms “selective en-
cryption” or “soft encryption” are sometimes used as op-
posed to classical “hard” encryption schemes like the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES [5]). Such schemes do
not strive for maximum security and trade off security for
computational complexity. They are designed to protect
multimedia content and fulﬁl the security requirements for
a particular multimedia application. For example, real-
time encryption for an entire video stream using classical
ciphers requires much computation time due to the large
amounts of data involved, on the other hand many multi-
media applications require security on a lower level (e.g.
TV broadcasting [9]). Therefore, the search for fast en-
cryption procedures speciﬁcally tailored to the target en-
vironment is mandatory for multimedia security applica-
tions. An overview about current requirements and imple-
mentations of contents protection systems for digital mul-
timedia data is given in [6].
Selective or partial encryption (SE) of visual data is
an example for such an approach. Here, application spe-
ciﬁc data structures are exploited to create more efﬁcient
encryption systems (see e.g. encryption of MPEG video
streams[13]). Consequently,selectiveencryptiononlypro-
tectsthevisuallymostimportantpartsofanimageorvideo
representation relying on a secure but slow “classical” ci-
pher. See [16] for a discussion of sensible application sce-
narios for this approach. The ﬁrst attempts in this direction
have been made to secure DCT-based multimedia repre-
sentations (see e.g. [1, 2, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22, 23]),
wavelet based [7, 11, 12, 19, 23] and quadtree based rep-
resentations [3, 4] have been considered also. Recently,
selective video encryption schemes resistant to bit errors
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[18] and compliant to video formats [20] have been pro-
posed for wireless environments.
In this work we proposeand evaluateselectivebitplane
encryption for conﬁdential transmission of image data in
mobile environments. In section 2 we introduce the main
ideas and discuss a possible application scenario. The se-
curity of the suggested approach is evaluated in section 3
by discussing the effectiveness of two ciphertext-only at-
tacks against our scheme. In the conclusion we summarize
the main results and give recommendations for a save use
of the proposed technique.
2. SELECTIVE BITPLANE ENCRYPTION
Intuitively, SE seems to be a good idea in any case since
it is always desirable to reduce the computational demand
involved in image processing applications. However, the
security of such schemes is always lower as compared to
full encryption. The only reason to accept this drawback
aresigniﬁcantsavingsintermsofprocessingtimeorpower.
Therefore, the environment in which SE should be ap-
pliedneedstobeinvestigatedthoroughlyinordertodecide
whether its use is sensible or not.
Due to requirements of certain applications a loss of
image quality may not be acceptable during transmission
or storage (e.g., in medical applications because of rea-
sons related to legal aspects and diagnosis accuracy [21]).
Therefore, lossless compression schemes need to be em-
ployed for such applications. We assume a target envi-
ronment, where due to the low processing power of the
involved hardware not even lossless compression and de-
compression of visual data is reasonable or possible (e.g.
mobile clients). Additionally, due to the increasing band-
width available at mobile communication channels, com-
pression seems not to be mandatory in any case, which
is especially true for lossless applications. The reason is
that the data reduction of lossless compression schemes
is much lower as compared to lossy ones making the re-
spective application less proﬁtable. Note also that the time
demand for compression is signiﬁcantly higher as the time
demand for encryption for almost all high quality codecs
and symmetrical ciphers (which is mostly due to the efﬁ-
cient cache use of block-based encryption). For example,lossless compression with JPEG2000 takes a factor 100
(!) longer as compared to AES encryption (both executed
in software). Therefore, it makes no sense to apply com-
pression before encryption if the aim is to reduce compu-
tational demand (unless compression is executed in hard-
ware and encryption in software). In applications where
image data is acquired the plain image data may be ac-
cessed directly after being captured by a digitizer without
being compressed. We assume the pictures to be captured
by a hand-hold device with mounted digital camera and
subsequently transmitted via a wireless channel. A con-
crete sample application for this scenario is teleradiology
with mobile image capturing clients to enable fast and ex-
act on-site diagnosis after an accident. Obviously, secur-
ing of patient related pictorial data is important.
For simplicity, we assume an 512
￿ 512 pixels image
to be given in 8bit/pixel (bpp) precision. We consider the
8bpp data in the form of 8 bitplanes, each bitplane asso-
ciated with a position in the binary representation of the
pixels. The SE approach is to AES encrypt a subset of
the bitplanes only, starting with the bitplane containing
the most signiﬁcant bit (MSB) of the pixels. Each pos-
sible subset of bitplanes may be chosen for SE, however,
the minimal percentage of data to be encrypted is 12.5 %
(when encrypting the MSB bitplane only), increasing in
steps of 12.5 % for each additional bitplane encrypted. We
use an AES implementation with blocksize 128 bit and a
128 bit key. The 128 bit block is ﬁlled with a quater of a
bitplane line (
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bits). The encrypted bitplanes
are transmitted together with the remaining bitplanes in
plain text.
(a) 12.5% encrypted (b) 25% encrypted, 9.0dB
Figure 1: Visual examples for selective bitplane encryp-
tion, direct reconstruction.
Fig. 1 shows two examples of directly reconstructed
images after selectively encrypting 1 and 2 bitplane(s).
Whereas in the case of encrypting the MSB only struc-
tural information is still visible, encrypting two bitplanes
leaves no useful information in the reconstruction, at least
when directly reconstructing the image data.
Note the pattern reminiscent of a bar code in the up-
per right quater of the image. Fig. 2.a shows the en-
crypted MSB of the Lena image where this pattern is ex-
hibited even clearer. This phenomenon due to the fact that
AES encryption is used with identical key for all blocks in
the image. Consequently, if there are identical plain text
quater-lines directly situated above each other which also
adhere to the AES block-border (i.e. starting at pixel po-
sitions 0, 128, 256, or 384), these data produce identical
ciphertext blocks. Identical blocks of ciphertext are again
arranged as identical quater-lines thereby generating the
barcode effect. For the corresponding region with identi-
cal quater-lines starting at pixel position 128 in the MSB
of the Lena image refer to Fig. 5.a.
(a) encrypted MSB (b) 50% encrypted, 31.8dB
Figure 2: Further visual examples for selective bitplane
encryption.
Note that it is of course important to encrypt the MSB
ﬁrst and continue with the bitplanes corresponding to the
next bits in the binary representation. Fig. 2.b shows
the case where the image is directly reconstructed after 4
bitplanes have been encrypted starting from the least sig-
niﬁcant bit (LSB). Almost no degradation is visible here
– consequently it hardly makes any sense at all to en-
crypt these data. Table 1 gives the PSNR values of im-
ages subjected to the SE approach. Whereas the PSNR is
constant 9 dB when encrypting the MSB ﬁrst, PSNR de-
creases steadily from 51 dB to 14 dB for each additional
bitplane encrypted and reaches 9 dB when encrypting all
bitplanes after all in the case when the LSB bitplane is en-
crypted ﬁrst.
# Bitplanes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
First: LSB 51 44 38 32 26 20 14 9
First: MSB 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Table 1: PSNR of images after direct reconstruction re-
lated to the number of encrypted bitplanes and to the or-
dering of the bitplanes.
A technique to eventually increase the security could
be not to disclose which bitpanes have been subjected toencryption besides the MSB. Fig. 3 shows directly recon-
structed images where the MSB and n-th most signiﬁcant
bitplanes have been encrypted. Clearly, the visual quality
is comparable to encrypting the MSB alone (compare Fig.
1.a).
(a) MSB + 4th (b) MSB + 5th
Figure 3: Visual examples for encryption of MSB and one
additional bitplane.
Additionally, the statistical properties of bitplanes of
natural images and encrypted bitplanes are fairly differ-
ent. Table 2 compares the number of runs consisting of 5
identical bits contained in bitplanes (plaintext and cipher-
text). All but the three less signiﬁcant bitplanes show a
much higher value of runs in the plaintext version. There-
fore, the “secret” which bitplanes have been encrypted can
be immediately solved using simple statistics.
Bitplane MSB 2 3 4 5 6 7 LSB
Plain 45 39 32 20 11 5 4 4
Encrypted 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Table 2: Number of runs consisting of 5 identical bits
(rounded to thousand, Lena image).
As a consequence, the most secure way to perform se-
lective bitplane encryption is to encrypt the MSB bitplane
and subsequently additional bitplanes in the order of de-
creasing signiﬁcance with respect to their position in the
binary representation.
3. EVALUATION OF SELECTIVE BITPLANE
ENCRYPTION
The aim of this section is to assess the security of selec-
tive bitplane encryption by conducting two types of simple
ciphertext-only attacks. A shortcoming of many SE inves-
tigations is the lack of quantifying the quality of the visual
data that can be obtained by attacks against SE. Mostly vi-
sual examples are provided only. The reason is the poor
correlation of PSNR and other simple quality measures
and perceived quality especially for low-quality images
[16]. Note for example that the PSNR computed between
the image Lena and its entirely AES encrypted version is
9.2 dB whereas PSNR between Lena and an image with
constant grayvalue 128 is 14.5 dB ! Both images do not
carry any structural information related to Lena, however,
the PSNR values differ more than 5 dB. However, for the
most simple attack we may evenrelate the visual examples
to meaningful numerical values.
3.1. Replacement Attack
Assuming the cipher in use is unbreakable we conduct the
ﬁrst attack by directly reconstructing the selectively en-
crypted images. However, the encrypted parts introduce
noise-type distortions (see Fig. 1). Therefore, we replace
the encrypted parts by artiﬁcial data mimicing typical im-
ages. The encrypted bitplane is replaced by a constant 0
bitplane and the resulting decreasein averageluminance is
compensated by adding 64 to each pixel if only the MSB
bitplane was encrypted, 96 if the MSB and next bitplane
have been encrypted, and so on. Subsequently, reconstruc-
tion is performed as usual, treating the encrypted and re-
placed parts as being non-encrypted.
(a) 25% encrypted, 13.2dB (b) 50% encrypted
Figure 4: Visual examples for the efﬁciency of the Re-
placement Attack.
Fig. 4 showstwo visual examplesof image reconstruc-
tions as obtained by the Replacement Attack (2 and 4 bit-
planes are encrypted). Whereas a direct reconstruction of
an image with 2 bitplanes encrypted suggests this setting
to be “safe” (with 9.0dB quality, see Fig. 1.b), the Re-
placement Attack revealsthat structural information is still
present in the reconstructed image (with 13.2dB quality,
see Fig. 4.a). However, the visual information is severely
alienated. Obviously, not only the visual appearance but
also the numerical PSNR values have been signiﬁcantly
improved by the Replacement Attack. In any case, even if
a Replacement Attack is mounted, encrypting 4 bitplanes
(i.e. 50% of the original data) leads to perfectly satisfying
results (Fig. 4.b).3.2. Reconstruction Attack
For the simplest case, we assume the MSB bitplane to be
encryptedonly. TheideaoftheReconstructionAttackisto
reconstruct the MSB data with the aid of the unencrypted
remaining data. We exploit the well known property, that
most regions of natural images are covered by areas with
smoothly changing gray values (except edges, of course).
In areasof thistype, the MSBsof all pixelstendto beiden-
tical (except for the case of medium luminance). In order
to automatically detect such areas we deﬁne a 2
￿ 2 pix-
els search window in which all 16 possible combinations
of MSB conﬁgurations are tested. In this test, a certain
set of differences among the 4 pixel values is computed
for each of the 16 MSB conﬁgurations. Out of the set
of differences, the smallest difference is selected and the
corresponding conﬁguration of the MSB bits in the search
window is deﬁned to be the reconstruction. Fig. 5.a shows
the MSB of the Lena image and Fig. 5.b a reconstructed
bitplane obtained as described above.
(a) original MSB (b) reconstructed bitplane
Figure 5: MSB of the Lena image and reconstructed Bit-
plane.
It is clearly visible that smooth areas are satisfacto-
rily recovered (black=0) whereas edges are represented by
white lines. This “edge-detection capability” is due to the
fact that when the search window hits an edge, the differ-
ence operation leads to an attempt to compensate thereby
setting the MSB to different values at both sides of the
edge. Fig. 6.a shows an image resulting from the Re-
construction Attack where about 50% of the smooth areas
are recovered correctly. A second difference exists with
equally low value which is obtained as well by setting all
MSB values constant (white=1) in smooth areas. Using
this as additional information, a second reconstruction is
obtained where the remaining 50% of the smooth areas
are recovered correctly (see Fig. 6.b).
Whencombiningthesetworeconstructed“half-images”
theoriginal maybeobtainedeasilybychoosingthecorrect
areas from the respective half-images (see Fig. 7).
However, the complexity of this attack increases sig-
niﬁcantly if more bitplanes are encrypted and also the re-
(a) half-image1 (b) half-image2
Figure 6: Lena Image after Reconstruction Attack (two
half-images).
Figure 7: Combination of two half-images after Recon-
struction Attack.
liability of the results is drastically reduced. Fig. 8 shows
the result of this attack mounted against an encryption of
two bitplanes where the attack is done in “separable” man-
ner to save computational complexity (i.e. ﬁrst the MSB
is attacked and the second encrypted bitplane is treated is
done in the Replacement Attack and then vice versa). The
result is hardly more useful as the result of direct recon-
struction (compare Fig 1.b).
4. CONCLUSION
We have proposed selective bitplane encryption to secure
imagetransmissioninmobileenvironmentswherenocom-
pression is involved. Two types of ciphertext only attacks
show clearly that encryption of the MSB bitplane only is
not secure enough. However, selectively encrypting two
bitplanes is sufﬁcient if severe alienation of the image data
isacceptable,whereastheencryptionoffourbitplanespro-
vides high conﬁdentiality.Figure 8: Lena Image after Reconstruction Attack, two
bitplanes encrypted.
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